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Abstract 
Why people accept intrinsically worthless fiat money in exchange for real goods 
and services has been a longstanding puzzle in economics. Attempts to explain the broad 
acceptance of fiat money have relied on either assuming that someone will exchange the 
fiat money for real consumption at the end of the horizon, or on pushing the puzzle of fiat 
money into infinite future in overlapping generations settings. We examine an alternative 
route that can explain the value of fiat money through a debt instrument which allows 
consumption to be moved backward in time. In this paper, we present empirical evidence 
that the theoretical predictions about the behavior of such economies work reasonably 
well in a laboratory experiment. The invention of fiat money and related debt instruments 
allow society to replace expensive commodities by costless paper and cut the dead weight 
loss associated with the former. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A longstanding puzzle in the use of fiat money is: what supports the value of 
intrinsically worthless paper money? In this paper, we test experimentally the proposition 
that the presence of an outside or central bank is sufficient to support the value of fiat 
money. Included in the reasons for the value of fiat money that have been offered, are 
those of Hahn (1965, 1971), Jevons (1875), and Shubik and Wilson (1977). They 
constitute a small sample of studies from an extensive literature on the subject most of 
which are sufficient, but not all are necessary. The reasons given for symbolic money to 
be valued are that: (1) it serves as a means to overcome the failure of the double 
coincidence of wants (e.g., when A wants a good owned by B, but has no good that B 
wants), because money is assumed to be wanted by all; (2) it minimizes transactions 
costs, providing a valued convenient way to trade; (3) it carries default penalties, i.e., one 
is penalized for owing money; (4) value is supported by high enough dynamic 
expectations;
1 and (5) it is supported by an outside bank.
2  
Monetary theory is a complex mixture involving economic optimization, 
expectations, trust and institutional considerations. Often there are several mechanisms 
that can be used to achieve the same ends. We consider only two, as experimentation 
enables us to validate the value of money in the presence of an outside bank.  This game 
has the property that the economy is able to substitute a nearly costless symbol of trade 
for a valuable commodity such as gold in the financing of transactions.  From the 
observations noted above we know that a bank is not necessary but is sufficient to 
achieve this result.
3 
In this paper we investigate the behavior of a minimal economy that includes an 
outside bank and a default penalty on unpaid loans. We chose to address reasons (3) and 
(5) listed above, as both bank loans and default penalties exist in the field and it is 
                                                 
1 For example, they might believe that prices will be stable in a booming economy in the future. 
2 Without going into technical details, for (3) if an individual has the strategic opportunity to default he will 
do so unless there is a penalty that is typically denominated in some form of disutility or loss related to the 
money value of the loss, For (4) see Grandmont (1983) for analysis of the role of expectations in supporting 
the value of money.  
3 Our view is that a modern monetary economy has much of its complexity reflected in the institutions and 
the laws that have evolved in the development of that society, thus assuming the existence of an outside 
bank is at least as reasonable as assuming trading based on pair-wise search. The former is better suited to 
the economies we live in and the latter is better suited to studies in early economic anthropology. They 
answer different questions.   3
straightforward to consider them experimentally. The other reasons merit separate 
investigation, and are outside the scope of this paper. We view financial institutions and 
the related laws as consequences of social evolution through custom and analysis. A 
minimal game tends to capture the analysis more than the evolution, as the time span of 
evolution is generally too long to replicate in the laboratory. 
We consider a finitely repeated game in which any money held at the end is 
worthless. However there is a banking system that allows individuals to borrow in such a 
way that they can avoid ending the game with worthless paper. The terminal period of the 
game is known exactly or with some uncertainty in advance and individuals can borrow 
at a specified interest rate, but must pay a bankruptcy penalty for ending in debt. The 
individuals can maximize their payoff by ending the game with zero money balances 
(Shubik, 1980, Dubey and Geanakoplos, 1992). We show experimentally that the 
economy becomes “cash consuming” as the theory predicts
4 if the holdings of the outside 
or government bank are not counted. In an exchange economy where fiat money is 
utilized the price level will be determined by the relationship among the initial amount of 
money held by the traders, the length of the game, the natural discount rate β for 
intertemporal consumption, and the bank rate of interest ρ. We compare the predictions 
suggested by theory with data observed in laboratory economies populated by profit 
motivated human agents and minimally intelligent (MI) algorithmic traders (specified 
later in detail) simulated on a computer.  
 
2.  BASIC THEORY 
  Consider an economy with two types of traders, who can trade two goods for 
money. One type of trader has an endowment of (a, 0,  m)
5 and the other has (0, a, m), 
where a, m > 0. In this economy, the traders of each type may borrow from a single bank 
at an announced rate of interest and then bid for the two available goods. The bank stands 
ready to lend a one-period loan to anyone at a fixed rate of interest ρ ≥ 0. 
                                                 
4 In the sense that all of the original endowment of fiat is drained away as interest payments to the outside 
bank , where they are not necessarily recycled into the economy. They could be retired or destroyed, or 
held as reserves. The definition of how much money a central bank holds and what are its reserves raises 
national accounting questions beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 That is, a units of good A, 0 units of good B, and m units of money.   4
  The individuals can pay the loan back at the beginning of the following period, or 
roll a part or all of the unpaid balance and interest over and add it to the next period’s 
loan.  One can only go bankrupt at the end where any outstanding debt is charged against 
the trader’s total earnings from the entire game. 
  Even at this level of simplicity several basic issues arise. Should the bank be a 
strategic player or a dummy? We have chosen it to be a dummy. Does it fix in advance 
the quantity of money to be lent, or the interest rate to be charged, or fix both as its 
modus operandi?  As the bank is a dummy we have chosen to specify an interest rate as a 
parameter in the game. We implicitly assume that the bank always has sufficient funds to 
lend, and thereby avoid having to discuss the details of the meaning of bank reserves. The 
bank permits the loans to be rolled over.  The roll over condition is an important feature 
in finance that enables borrowers to delay any day of reckoning by replacing a current 
constraint by a future one. 
  For simplicity we stipulate that any positive money balances carried from one 
period to the next do not earn any interest.
6 A more general game would permit traders to 
deposit in, as well as borrow from, a bank thereby earning returns on any surplus 
financial capital. In the model economy, we limit the players to borrowing for two 
reasons. The first is to keep the game as simple as possible by defining a smaller choice 
set for players, i.e., confining their financial decision to the amount of borrowing instead 
of the amounts of borrowing and lending/deposit.  The second reason is that in 
illustrating the value of paper money that has no given positive terminal value we need to 
investigate the behavior of the players at the terminal points and to compare it with the 
predictions of a finite period dynamic programming model of trade with a specified 
salvage value condition.  
The experiment requires that the individuals make two decisions, a financial 
decision to borrow an amount d and a market decision to bid amounts bi with i =1,2 for 
each of the two goods. This game is known as the “sell-all” game where all individuals 
                                                 
6 Historically in U.S., real deposit rates have been close to zero, while historical interest rates on loans have 
been positive.   5
put up for sale their entire endowment of goods.
7 The derivations are given for both 
games in two appendices in Quint and Shubik (2008). For the sell-all game of T periods, 
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In the game and analysis we confine the structure of the utility function to: 










t m y x μ β β  
where β is a natural time discount rate for consumption,  10√ is the utility function for a 
level of consumption of xit  units of good A and yit units of good B during period t, and μ 
is the penalty for bankruptcy (i.e., holding a negative cash balance at the end of the game 
in period T). There are T time periods, followed by full settlement at the beginning of 
period T+1. In the finite games one may set β such that 0 <β ≤1. In order to preserve the 
boundedness of the payoffs in infinite horizon models, 0 ≤ β < 1.  Zero expected 
monetary inflation requires the Fisher condition 1+ρ = 1/β to hold. If exogenous 
uncertainty is present in the economy, the noninflationary condition must be replaced by 
a somewhat more complex condition (see Karatzas et al. 2006). 
                                                 
7 There is a closely related and somewhat more complex “buy-sell” game (see Huber, et al. 2007a) in which 
the individuals make an additional decision q about the amount of their endowed good they offer for sale. 
Much of the current paper is limited to results from the simpler sell-all game.   6
In the above expressions we note a considerable simplification when 1+ρ = 1/β, bt 
= b1, pt = p1, and dt = β
T-tm/(1- β
T).  
  In the experiment it is specified that at the termination of play after settlement of 
debt, any amount of money retained by the traders is of no value and any unpaid debt is 
of negative salvage value; it is subtracted from the payout to the players. 
   In actual economic life the length of the lags in payments and delivery of goods 
varies considerably. Lags are possible in delivery of both money and goods. For the sake 
of simplicity we assume that the goods traded arrive in time to be utilized in the same 
period in which they are traded and payments are delayed until the following period. 
  When the goods endowments of the individuals are given by (a, 0) and (0, a) and 
the initial amount of money held by each agent is m, Quint and Shubik (2008) show that 
the competitive market price of the goods at time t is given above together with the 
amount borrowed and the bid.  
  In our six treatments, we fixed parameters a = 200, ρ = 0.05, and m = 1,000. For 
three treatments each we used T = 10 and 20. With ρ = 0.05, depending on the value of β 
the theoretically predicted equilibrium price path is inflationary (β = 1), flat (β = 1/1.05) 
or deflationary (β = 1/1.15). We label these six treatments after this theoretical price path 
and the number of periods (10 or 20): INFL_10, INFL_20, FLAT_10, FLAT_20, 
DEFL_10, and DEFL_20 (see overview in Table 1) to get one inflationary, one flat, and 
one deflationary price path of 10 and 20 periods respectively.
8 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Each treatment of the economy is cash consuming. The interpretation is that the initial 
amount of government money m per capita that the traders are endowed with is not 
merely used for transactions but is also eaten up in the finite horizon game by the interest 
payments on extra money borrowed from the bank. As the horizon gets longer, the size of 
the equilibrium initial borrowing drops, and so do the initial prices (see Tables 2 and 3). 
(Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here) 
                                                 
8 To check the robustness of our results we conducted one additional run with a higher interest rate of 15 
percent. Specifically, a = 200, β = 1/1.15, ρ =0.15, m = 1,000, T = 20. As β(1+ ρ)=1 the predicted price 
path is flat and the treatment is thus labeled FLAT_20_rho_15%. Results for this treatment are presented at 
the end of the paper.   7
Mathematically the system is no longer homogeneous of order zero in prices; the initial 
supply of fiat money makes the system non-homogeneous, but the cash consumption 
removes this feature by the end of the game.  
It is also worth noting that when β = 1 there is a singularity in the system in the 
sense that the infinite horizon utility is unbounded. Furthermore with ρ = 0 no cash is 
removed from the economy and in the limit the payoffs become unbounded. In contrast, 
as ρ approaches but does not attain zero, the price approaches but does not quite attain a 
lower limit.  
There are many variants and extensions of this model that merit investigation but 
are not covered in this experiment. Much of the basic theory has been explored by Bennie 
(2006) who derives explicit formulae for cyclical endowments. This calls for models with 
a bank that makes loans as well as accepts deposits. Further results with exogenous 
uncertainty, i.e., uncertain assets under low and high information conditions have been 
considered by Bennie (2006).  
 
2.1. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE VALUE OF FIAT 
  Huber et al. (2007a and 2007b) report experiments in which fiat money and 
personal credit were given value.  In comparing those results with the results of the 
present experiment it is important to stress a feature of economic dynamics.  Because 
there may be many institutional arrangements that can achieve the same purpose it can be 
highly misleading to seek a single cause. Here we show that the presence of an outside 
bank is sufficient to support the value of fiat.  
Experimental gaming requires terminal conditions. The contrast between fiat 
money and gold illustrates the importance of understanding the distinction between a 
durable assets and its stream of services. If gold is valued at zero at the end, it is a 
wasting asset; it is more reasonable to attach a positive value representing at least the 
value of the discounted stream of consumption or production services still present. With 
fiat a zero salvage value indicates that the economy has ended, and as there are no more 
transactions, fiat is worthless.   8
2.1.1. Fiat Money and Expectations 
In the experiment with a “sell-all” market without borrowing or lending in Huber 
et al. (2007a) the support came through expectations specified in the experiment in the 
terminal conditions.  This confirmed the theoretical structure analyzed by Grandmont 
(1983). As the amount of money was fixed there was no opportunity for inflation as 
encountered in our INFL-treatments here. 
The high level of efficiency we observe in our markets (95.9 to 99.2 percent) 
mirrors the efficiency of 97.6 percent we saw in sell-all markets without a bank in Huber 
et al. 2007a. This suggests that (i) the market mechanism itself produces a high level of 
efficiency and (ii) a bank has no obvious beneficial or negative consequences for overall 
efficiency in this model. 
However, we do find a marked difference in the average money holdings at the 
end of a period between the sell-all markets in Huber et al. (2007a) and the markets 
explored in the present experiment. In Huber et al. (2007a) between 30 and 34 percent of 
the money endowment was kept unspent, and this fraction remained quite stable over the 
20 periods of trading. In the markets explored here we see falling unspent money 
balances and an overall average of roughly 7.5 percent. This difference can be attributed 
to the salvage values of positive money holdings being zero here and. positive in Huber et 
al. (2007a). 
 
2.1.2. Personal Credit and a Perfect Clearinghouse 
  In Huber et al, (2007b) fiat or outside money does not exist. Instead each 
individual is allowed to personalize credit, and a clearinghouse arrangement prevents 
worthless credit from being issued. 
 
3.  THE EXPERIMENTAL SET UP 
We conducted and report on six (plus one control) treatments of this market game. 
For each treatment, we conducted two experimental runs for a total of twelve runs (plus 
one, see Table 1). In each run, the participants traded two goods labeled A and B, for 
money. Each run had ten participants, five of them endowed with ownership claim to 200 
units of A and none of B, while the other five had ownership claim to 200 units of B and   9
none of A. All had the same starting endowment of money m = 1,000. The interest rate 
for loans (ρ) was fixed at 5 percent per period in all treatments.
9  
All goods are consumed at the end of each period with no balances of goods A 
and B carried over from one period to the next; endowments of goods are reinitialized at 
the start of each period. Money holdings (positive and negative) are carried over to the 
following period.  
The trading mechanism is a simple call market: all traders submit two numbers 
for the amount of money they invest to buy goods A and B. The maximum amount a 
trader can invest is the sum of his beginning of the period money holdings plus the loan 
he takes out from the bank. The computer then calculates the total money bid for good A 
and for good B. We use a sell-all model in which all endowments of goods are sold. To 
derive the price for A the sum of all bids for A is divided by the total endowment of good 
A (5 times 200 = 1,000). The same is done for B. Traders endowed with A receive as 
income 200 times the price of A, and similarly for B.
10  
Each period the ending money balance of each trader is his starting money 
balance minus the amount of money tendered for the two goods plus the income from 
selling his 200 endowed units of either A or B minus interest on any loan. Money 
holdings influence earnings directly only in the last period of the session when negative 
money holdings are divided by four and deducted from the total points earned. Positive 
money holdings at the end of the session have no value and are discarded. This may be 
interpreted as stating that the expected value of leftover fiat money is zero. 
In each period the traders can earn points that are converted to dollars at a pre-
announced exchange rate at the end of the experiment. Specifically  
Points earned = 
1 10
− ⋅ ∗ ⋅
Period
ij ij y x β  
with xij and yij the number of units of A and B held at the end of a period. The last 
term with β is the discount rate of points and with β<1, points earned in later periods are 
not as valuable (in take home dollars) as points earned in the beginning. β is thus the 
main variable to distinguish our treatments, as it defines the theoretical price path. By 
                                                 
9 As mentioned earlier, we conducted a seventh treatment where the interest rate is set to 15 percent as a 
robustness check and is labeled FLAT_20_rho_15%. 
10 For more details see Huber et al. 2007a.   10
varying the value of β, we chose (1+ρ)β to be greater than, less than or equal to 1 so as to 
expect to encounter inflation, deflation, and a steady price level in the respective 
treatments. In INFL_10 and INFL_20, with 10 and 20 periods respectively, β = 1, and 
therefore (1+ρ)β = 1.05, theory predicts inflation. Theoretically the rate of inflation 
should be lower in the longer treatment INFL_20. In Treatments FLAT_10 and FLAT_20 
(1+ρ)β is 1 which theoretically should yield flat prices. Finally, in Treatments DEFL_10 
and DEFL_20 (1+ρ)β = 1.05/1.15 = 0.9134, which is expected to generate deflationary 
price paths. In these treatments loans and prices should be highest at the beginning, when 
many points can be earned. 
 
3.1. A comment on oligopolistic behavior 
  Huber et al. (2007a, 2007b) noted the influence of the number of players when 
there are only a few players. This influence is also present in the current experiment (with 
ten players) and is manifested in the distinction between the competitive and non-
cooperative equilibria. However, since that difference is less than 1 percent, and is not the 
main question investigated in this paper, it is reasonable to use the competitive 
equilibrium solution as a benchmark for comparing the experimental results. 
 
3.2. Overview over the treatments 
Treatment INFL_10: ρ = 0.05, β=1, 10 periods, inflationary prices  
In Treatment 1 β = 1, meaning that the value of goods (the points earned for 
consuming them) is the same in each period. With a positive interest rate this should lead 
to inflationary prices, as reflected in the levels of equilibrium loans and prices for this and 
all other treatments are presented in Tables 1 and 2. INFL_10 ran for 10 periods and we 
conducted two runs of this treatment with 10 subjects each. The instructions including 
screenshots are shown in Appendix A.  
Treatment INFL_20: ρ = 0.05, β=1, 20 periods, inflationary prices  
Treatments INFL_10 and INFL_20 are distinguished only by the length of the 
run, with INFL_20 running 20 periods.  
Treatment FLAT_10: ρ = 0.05, β=1/1.05, 10 periods, flat prices    11
This treatment ran for 10 periods and features β=1/1.05. With an interest rate of 5 
percent this means that (1+ρ)β=1. Equilibrium prices are therefore steady. We conducted 
two runs of this treatment. In the first run the software “froze” after period 18, so we have 
data only for the first 18 periods. 
Treatment FLAT_20: ρ = 0.05, β=1/1.05, 10 periods, flat prices  
This treatment ran for 20 periods and again has β=1/1.05. Equilibrium prices are 
therefore stable. We conducted two runs of this treatment and the equilibrium prices and 
loans can be again seen in Tables 1 and 2. 
Treatment DEFL_10: ρ = 0.05, β=1/1.15, 10 periods, deflationary prices  
This treatment ran for 10 periods and here β=1/1.15. With an interest rate of 5 
percent this means that (1+ρ)β = 0.9134. This implies that points earned at the beginning 
are more valuable and thus equilibrium prices and loans decrease over time. We 
conducted two runs of this treatment. 
Treatment DEFL_20: ρ = 0.05, β=1/1.15, 10 periods, deflationary prices  
This treatment is distinguished from DEFL_10 only by a higher duration of 20 
periods. Again we conducted two runs. 
All Treatments were conducted with software written using z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). Six of the runs were conducted at Yale University in January and February 2007. 
The other seven runs were carried out at University of Innsbruck in March and October 
2007. Average payments were $22 at Yale and €19 in Innsbruck. While most subjects 
had participated in experiments in economics before, no student participated in more than 
one of the runs of the type presented in this paper. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
Although the rules of the game are simple, the considerations of the terminal 
conditions, price and borrowing behavior call for a sophisticated strategy. Our concern in 
this section is to see what aspects of the theoretical predictions of general equilibrium 
(GE) are confirmed by the observed outcomes of these games. In Section 5 we will also 
explore how efficiently the markets function when they are populated with appropriately   12
defined minimally intelligent agents. We focus on the development of prices, loans, 




Equilibrium predictions for price paths are different for the six treatments. GE 
predicts inflationary prices in treatments INFL_10 and INFL_20, stable prices in 
FLAT_10 and FLAT_20, and falling prices in DEFL_10 and DEFL_20 (see Table 2 for 
an overview on GE predictions). Figure 1 shows the realized and equilibrium price paths 
for all six treatments.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
We see that in each run the slope of price paths for the two goods conform to the 
theoretical GE prediction, i.e., we observe inflation in the INFL treatments, relatively 
stable prices in the FLAT treatments and price decreases in the DEFL treatments. The 
coefficients in linear regression of prices over time (periods) are presented in Table 4.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
They are significantly positive for each run and each good in the INFL treatments 
(t-values 6.91 or higher for all price series), not significantly different from zero in seven 
out of eight FLAT treatments (t-values between -0.58 and 2.03), and significantly 
negative in the DEFL treatments (t-values of -7.36 or less for all price series). Conformity 
of the slopes of empirical and theoretical GE price paths implies that these markets were 
able to assess the implications of different βs in the different treatments.  
When looking for differences across treatments with different time horizons we 
observe that prices in all three shorter treatments (10 periods) are mostly below GE 
prices, while in the 20-period treatments price levels are close to or above the GE levels. 
Prices are mostly below GE prices in the 10-period setting because participants did not 
always spend all their money, and kept a small percentage (usually around 10 percent) 
unspent.   
A comparison of prices in INFL_10 and INFL_20 demonstrates the effect of the 
time horizon on the rate of inflation. Price levels in both treatments started at the same 
                                                 
11 The control treatment FLAT_20_rho_15% will be briefly discussed towards the end of the paper and 
presented in Figure 7.   13
level, but increased faster in INFL_10, reaching an average of 19.34 by period 10 vs. 
only 9.20 in INFL_20. The data conform to the GE prediction of the effect of time 
horizon on the rate of inflation in this economy as if the subjects understood what the 
consequences of their actions in the market were. Similarly, prices in FLAT_10 are on 
average 11.34 vs. only 7.65 in FLAT_20; this difference is also in line with theoretical 
predictions. For the deflationary treatments the theoretical predictions of price paths and 
levels hold as well, i.e., both are decreasing and prices are higher in the shorter treatment.  
 
4.2. Borrowing 
The evolution of prices is closely reflected in the evolution of borrowing by 
traders, as prices strongly depend on the money available to subjects. In GE the size of 
the average loan increases in the INFL, increases at a slower rate in FLAT treatments, 
and decreases in DEFL_10 and DEFL_20 (see Table 3 for details). Figure 2 shows that 
the general patterns predicted by GE are present in the experimental data with loans 
increasing in all runs of the first four treatments, but decreasing in the last two.  
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
The total loan balances in INFL_10 increased over time, and remained mostly 
below GE levels. In INFL_20, loan balances increased steadily over time, and remained 
mostly above GE levels – especially in the last few periods, when subjects tried to get rid 
of their remaining cash by taking out larger loans.  
GE predicts higher loans in the 10-period setting than in the longer setting. This is 
exactly what we find: loans taken in INFL_10 were on average 47 percent higher than the 
respective numbers in the first ten periods of INFL_20. Similarly, average loans in the 
first 10 periods of FLAT_10 are 70 percent higher than those of FLAT_20, again in line 
with theoretical predictions. In the deflationary treatments theory suggests higher loan 
levels in the 10-period market in the first ten periods and the data support this prediction.  
Thus the prices and loan data generated in these markets populated with profit-
motivated human agents re consistent with the theoretical predictions,    14
4.3. Development of Money Balances over Time  
GE prediction for all six treatments is that money holdings are zero after the last 
period. However, as participants faced some uncertainty about the exact length of the 
experiments in eight of the runs
12 and as the computational task is quite demanding, even 
getting close to GE predictions is remarkable. Figure 3 presents the development of 
average money holdings over time in the six treatments.  
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
Comparing the development of average money holdings in the treatments we 
observe similarities and differences. In all treatments average money holdings decrease, 
thus the economy is cash consuming. In the shorter treatments INFL_10, FLAT_10, and 
DEFL_10 money holdings are above GE levels in all six runs, while in the longer 
treatments money holdings are below GE levels in five of six runs. This is mostly a result 
of different GE paths, which would have required faster spending in the shorter 
treatments. However, we consider not the deviations, but the closeness to GE paths as 
remarkable.  
We also see that participants took the length of the experimental economy into 
account. Table 5 shows the average money holdings after period 10, separated for the 10-
period and 20-period economies. Holdings in the longer treatments are more than two 
times as large as in the shorter treatments, as participants took smaller loans and kept 
more money at the end of the tenth period in the longer sessions.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Money holdings yield a proxy for the accuracy of decision making. Traders may 
decide to keep some of their money unspent for various reasons. However, as loans cost 
money it is not rational to take a loan and then not spend some of the money (it earns no 
interest). We compute for each period and each participant the percentage of money left 
unspent, and calculate the respective averages for traders who did and did not take a loan. 
Table 6 shows that on average those who took out a loan kept only 2.8 percent of their 
                                                 
12 In eight of the runs participants faced some uncertainty about the exact length of the experiment. In the 
short treatments they were told that the session would last 8 to 12 periods and in the long sessions they 
knew it would be 18 to 22 periods. The eight runs are both runs of INFL_10, INFL_20, DEFL_10, and 
FLAT_20. In all other runs participants knew exactly how many periods they would trade.   15
overall money balance unspent, while those who did not take a loan kept 11.7 percent 
unspent. This pattern was visible in every one of the treatments.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Over time we find that the amount of money left unspent decreases in all markets, 
but the averages are almost always lower for participants who took a loan than those who 
did not take a loan. The respective averages are shown in Figure 4.  
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
This reflects learning effects as well as the desire to get rid of money towards the 
end of the runs (when it becomes worthless). This is also supported by looking at the 
number of traders taking a loan (recall that paying interest on loans is the only way to get 
rid of the endowed money). Figure 5 shows that the number of participants taking a loan 
increases both for the 10-period and the 20-period treatments.  
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
 
4.4. Efficiency 
 Overall efficiency levels (as measured by the points earned as a percentage of the 
maximum achievable) range from 95.9 to 99.2 percent, reflecting a high degree of 
“balanced” investments (almost equal investments in the two goods) by most traders 
beginning in period 1 (see Figure 6).. Efficiency in the last period is higher than in the 
first period in all runs, suggesting learning effects.  
(Insert Figure 6 about here) 
Having observed less money saved by those who take a loan we expect them to 
earn more.  This is indeed the case: average earnings for traders who take a loan in a 
specific period are 99.98 percent of points that can be earned.
13 By comparison, traders 
who did not take a loan earned on average 92.32 percent of the points they could have 
achieved in the respective period (see Table 7).  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
                                                 
13 Note that in some of the markets (e.g. INFL_10 and FLAT_10) earnings of more than 100 percent are 
achieved by those taking loans. This can happen because these traders buy more goods and thus earn more 
points at the expense of those without a loan – those end up earning only 85 and 87 percent of the points 
they could have earned, respectively.   16
We conclude that traders who took a loan spent almost all of their money, split it 
more equally than those who did not take a loan and thus they earned significantly more 
than those without a loan. 
 
4.5. On Uncertainty 
In eight of the runs presented here we permitted a small amount of uncertainty 
concerning termination, but there was no exogenous uncertainty in each period. In Tables 
5 to 8 the treatments with uncertainty are shaded, while the others are not. The main 
results hold for all treatments. However, the analysis and possibly the comprehension of 
the game are considerably more complicated when exogenous uncertainty is present. We 
see higher money holdings at the end (see Table 8) in the treatments with uncertainty 
than in the other treatments. Treatment INFL_20, where the length is uncertain, is an 
exception, as here average money holdings in the end were negative. However, in both 
runs this was driven by one or two individuals who took exceptionally large loans and 
ended with up to 27,000 in debt.  
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
Given that traders were confronted with some uncertainty about the exact number 
of periods in the sessions, and that the subjects are unlikely to have been able to compute 
the equilibrium price paths, the results are largely consistent with the GE theory and 
some deviations from GE price levels should not be surprising.  
 
5. MARKET WITH MINIMALLY INTELLIGENT (MI) AGENTS 
We examine the behavior of this economy with an outside bank when it is 
populated by minimally intelligent (MI) artificial agents who follow simple pre-specified 
decision rules. The purpose of this examination is to learn the extent to which the 
properties of the outcomes of this economy may follow from its structure and are robust 
to behavioral variations of the agents. In previous studies we have contrasted the 
outcomes of market games against three benchmarks (see Huber et al. 2007a, b). Two of 
these are competitive and have subgame perfect non-cooperative equilibria derived from 
optimization by individual economic agents; the third is the outcome from markets 
populated by minimally intelligent agents who randomly pick their choices from their   17
opportunity sets (see Gode-Sunder, 1993). Here we face a somewhat more difficult 
problem that calls for describing the minimal abilities required to operate in multiple 
markets for goods and credit. We suspect that they are qualitatively different. 
 
5.1. Agents with limits 
  For an appropriate interpretation of minimally intelligent agents in this economy, 
several considerations are relevant. First, such agents need external constraints on the 
domain from which they can choose their actions. Second, these agents do not anticipate 
the future, and thus their actions are not influenced by consequences that might be 
foreseeable by more intelligent agents with powers of anticipation. Finally, they choose 
their actions randomly from the opportunity set available to them. Note that the behavior 
of an economy that have no value of residual money balances and includes a debt market 
and is populated with such myopic investors should be expected to differ significantly 
from the operation of an economy with intelligent agents who can anticipate the future 
including the possibility of default and its consequences (e.g., bankruptcy) when debt is 
available. While these considerations are not unique, they appear to be a reasonable start. 
It is always possible to investigate the consequences of alternative specifications of such 
agents.  
  The minimally intelligent agents are here defined as follows: (1) at the beginning 
of each period, they choose their total spending on goods A and B as a random number 
drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, max(0, (Beginning cash balance + credit limit))), 
where the beginning cash balance is m in period 1; in the subsequent periods, it is the 
cash from the sale of the endowed good (A or B) minus any borrowing and interest on 
that borrowing in the preceding period. The max function ensure that if the beginning 
cash balance is more negative than the credit limit, spending of the agent during that 
period must be zero. Unlike intelligent agents, these minimally intelligent agents do not 
anticipate the penalty associated with outstanding debt at the end of the session. Finally, 
the total spending chosen is split between goods A and B using a randomly drawn 
fraction distributed uniformly U(0,1). The agents are unintelligent borrowers; if credit is 
available they may take it much like a subprime borrower with little anticipation or even 
understanding of the future. Credit limitation rules of good banking prevent them from   18
overloading on loans and the subsequent disaster. The extra intelligence in a responsible 
bank makes up for any shortfalls in the individual borrowers. 
As far as possible the variables have been set as in the experiment with humans. 
Thus the cash endowment in period 1 is fixed at 1,000 and identical for all agents. The 
market is also populated with five traders of each of two types with complementary 
consumption good endowments of (200,0) and (0,200) respectively. In human subject 
economies, there is no limit on the amount of borrowing; in MI economies, subjects must 
borrow enough money to bring any negative cash balance at the beginning of the period 
to zero, and if their beginning of the period cash balance is positive, they borrow an 
amount equal to a uniformly drawn random number between zero and the beginning cash 
balance discounted by interest for one period times a fixed multiplier (we used multiplier 
1). The interest rate (5 percent), payoff multiplier (10), payoff exponent (0.5, i.e. the 
square root), and penalty multiplier for unpaid loans (0.25) are all set as in the human 
experiment. We report the results of the same three different natural discount rates as in 
the experiment with humans (0, 5 and 15 percent).  
 
5.2. Results 
  In Huber et al. (2007a) similarly defined agents were able to produce reasonable 
prices, price paths and a quite high level of efficiency. While the efficiency of markets 
populated with MI agents, at 79 percent, is similar as in Huber et al. (2007a), these 
markets fare worse when it comes to prices, price paths, and loans. MI-agents, as set up 
by us, do not take the natural rate of discount (β) into account when making their 
decisions. Therefore price paths, money holdings, and loan levels do not depend on β. 
Representative price, loan and money holing paths are shown in each panel of Figures 1, 
2, and 3. While humans did take β into account and we thus observed inflation, flat prices 
or deflation, we do not observe different price paths in the MI agent simulation. Here 
prices decrease slightly over time, as interest on loans slowly depletes the money 
available to bid for the (fixed number of) goods A and B. Similarly, loans decrease 
slightly over time, irrespective of β, and as we chose a rather conservative credit limit 
that precludes the possibility of bankruptcy, MI-agents on average kept most of their 
initial money endowment until the end of the simulation (see Figure 2). As shown in   19
Tables 5 and 7 and in Figure 3, MI-agents on average still have 774 of their initial 1,000 
cash after period 10, and 612 after period 20. This deviates strongly from GE predictions 
and from what we observe in our experiments with human subjects who get much closer 
to GE predictions.
14 
In Figure 6 we compare efficiency (i.e. points earned as percentage of the 
maximum possible) of markets populated by MI agents with the human experiments. We 
find that the MI agents have lower efficiency in each period.  
In Tables 6 and 8, presenting the percentage of money unspent and the earnings 
with and without loans respectively, no numbers are given for MI, as we defined our 
agents to spend all their cash each period and each agent takes a loan each period. The 
same is true for Figures 4 and 5. 
We conclude that a market populated by minimally intelligent agents, as specified 
here, reaches a satisfyingly high level of efficiency, though still significantly lower than 
the level reached by humans. However, ignorant of the influence β has, MI-agents are not 
able to produce the distinct price paths that GE theory predicts and experiments with 
humans produced. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we report that an outside bank and a default penalty are sufficient to 
ensure the value of fiat money in a simple laboratory economy. In addition we find that 
the markets populated by profit-motivated human subjects in our laboratory experiment 
yield outcomes that take the relationship of natural discount rate and interest rate into 
account to produce inflationary, flat, or deflationary price paths in line with theory. 
Minimally intelligent agents, which do not anticipate the future are not able to produce 
such distinct price paths. While simpler markets populated with such agents function 
reasonably well (e.g., Huber et al. 2007a), managing a borrowing relationship with a bank 
is more complex and requires additional abilities such as some elementary way to predict 
future states. We plan to continue further exploration of the minimal level of trader 
intelligence necessary to achieve efficiency in various market structures.  
                                                 
14 Other specifications of the MI agents, especially higher loans, would bring these markets closer to GE. 
However, we considered the chosen parameters to be reasonable interpretation of the concept of minimally 
intelligent agents.   20
Both commodity as well as fiat money can provide transaction services. However, 
unlike commodity money, fiat money has no alternative uses, and thus has zero 
opportunity cost.  It is hardly surprising, then, that the use of a fiat or abstract means of 
payment is a broad systemic property of a modern mass economy. It can be supported 
institutionally in many ways. In three experiments we have provided evidence for 
workability of three different arrangements—expectations (Huber et al. 2007a), an 
efficient clearinghouse (Huber et al. 2007b) and an outside bank in the current paper. We 
find that markets populated by profit-motivated human subjects and an outside bank work 
remarkable well and are able to interpret different natural discount rates and produce 
price paths that reflect general equilibrium predictions.   
   21
Table 1: The Experimental Design 
(Interest rate (ρ) = 0.05 in all treatments except 0.15 in the last column) 
  INFL_10 INFL_20 FLAT_10 FLAT_20 DEFL_10 DEFL_20  FLAT_20, 
Rho = 0.15 








(1+ρ) / β 
= 1.05 
(1+ρ) / β 
= 1.05 
(1+ρ) / β 
= 1 
(1+ρ) / β 
= 1 












inflation inflation  flat  flat  deflation  deflation  flat 
 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium Prices for the Six Treatments 
  INFL_10  INFL_20 FLAT_10 FLAT_20 DEFL_10 DEFL_20 
1  10.50    5.25  12.95  8.02  18.19  14.59 
2  11.02    5.51  12.95  8.02  16.61  13.32 
3  11.58    5.79  12.95  8.02  15.17  12.16 
4  12.16    6.08  12.95  8.02  13.85  11.10 
5  12.76    6.38  12.95  8.02  12.64  10.14 
6  13.40    6.70  12.95  8.02  11.54    9.26 
7  14.07    7.04  12.95  8.02  10.54    8.45 
8  14.77    7.39  12.95  8.02    9.62    7.72 
9  15.51    7.76  12.95  8.02    8.79    7.05 
10  16.29    8.14  12.95  8.02    8.02    6.43 
11      8.55    8.02      5.87 
12      8.98    8.02      5.36 
13      9.43    8.02      4.90 
14      9.90    8.02      4.47 
15   10.39   8.02       4.08 
16   10.91   8.02       3.73 
17   11.46   8.02       3.40 
18   12.03   8.02       3.11 
19   12.63   8.02       2.84 
20   13.27   8.02       2.59   22
Table 3: Equilibrium Loans for the Six Treatments 
  INFL_10  INFL_20 FLAT_10 FLAT_20 DEFL_10 DEFL_20 
1  1,100        50  1,590     605  2,639  1,917 
2  1,260     105  1,670     635  2,454  1,760 
3  1,433     165  1,753     667  2,288  1,616 
4  1,621     232  1,841     700  2,139  1,485 
5  1,823     304  1,933     735  2,005  1,366 
6  2,042     383  2,029     772  1,885  1,258 
7  2,278     469  2,131     811  1,778  1,160 
8  2,533     563  2,237     851  1,684  1,071 
9  2,807     665  2,349     894  1,601     991 
10  3,103     776  2,467     938  1,528     918 
11       896       985       852 
12   1,026  1,035        792 
13   1,167  1,086        739 
14   1,320  1,141        690 
15   1,485  1,198        647 
16   1,663  1,257        609 
17   1,855  1,320        574 
18   2,063  1,386        544 
19   2,286  1,456        517 
20   2,527  1,528        493 
 
 
Table 4: Theoretical and Estimated Slope coefficients (t-statistics) in OLS 
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Table 5: Money Holdings at the End of Period 10  










INFL_10      0  774  302  112  491 
INFL_20  794  774  580  452  708 
FLAT_10      0  774 144  177  111 
FLAT_20  614  774  501  324  677 
DEFL_10      0  774  185  346  23 
DEFL_20  341  774 279  274  284 
Average_10  0  774 210  212 275 
Average_20  583  774 453  350 556 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Money Kept Unspent by Borrowers and Non-borrowers 
(Treatments with uncertain horizon are shaded) 
 (Averages across those periods when at least one trader was in the respective group) 
  Percentage of money unspent by 
borrowers 
Percentage of money unspent by 
Non-borrowers 
INFL_10  2.5%    8.9% 
INFL_20  7.3%  12.3% 
FLAT_10  1.9%    9.4% 
FLAT_20  2.8%  14.4% 
DEFL_10  1.0%  15.3% 
DEFL_20 1.1%  10.0% 
Average   2.8%   11.7% 
  
 
Table 7: Efficiency: Average Points Earned per Period as Percentage of Maximum 
Possible for Borrowers and Non-borrowers 
(Treatments with uncertain horizon are shaded) 
 (Averages across those periods when at least one trader was in the respective group) 
 Percentage  of  maximum  possible 
points earned 
Percentage of maximum possible 
points earned 
INFL_10  104.32%  85.07% 
INFL_20    96.95%  87.83% 
FLAT_10 102.94%  87.57% 
FLAT_20  100.08%  94.95% 
DEFL_10    97.89%  99.63% 
DEFL_20    97.88%  98.87% 
Average     99.98%   92.32%   24
  
Table 8: Money Holdings at the End  














INFL_10  0  774    302       112    491 
INFL_20  0  612  -880  -1,179  -580 
FLAT_10  0  774    144      177    111 
FLAT_20  0  612    501      324    677 
DEFL_10  0  774    185      346      23 
DEFL_20  0  612    279      274    284 
   25
Figure 1: Time Series of Observed Transaction Prices in the Six Treatments and in 
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Figure 2: Time Series of Observed Borrowings in the Six Treatments and in 
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Figure 3: Time Series of Average Money Balances in the Six Treatments and in 
Simulations with Minimally Intelligent (MI) Agents Compared to GE Predictions 
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Figure 4: Average Percentage of Money Kept Unspent by Borrowers vs. Non-
borrowers in the 10-period Sessions (left) and the 20-period Sessions (right) 
 
Average percentage of money unspent by those who 








































Average percentage of money unspent by those who 









































Figure 5: Average Number of Borrowers by Period 
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Figure 6: Time Series of Allocative Efficiency in the Six Treatments and in 
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Appendix A: Instructions for INFL_10 
General 
This is an experiment in market decision making. If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which will be paid to you 
at the end of the run. 
  This run consists of 8 to 12 periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning of 
each period, five of the participants will receive as income the proceeds from selling 200 
units of good A, for which they have ownership claim. The other five are entitled to the 
proceeds from selling 200 units of good B. In addition you will get 1,000 units of money 
at the start of the experiment. Depending on how many units of goods A and B you buy 
and on the proceeds from selling your goods and borrowing from a bank, this amount will 
change from period to period. 
During each period we shall conduct a market in which the price per unit of A and 
B will be determined. All units of A and B will be sold at this price, and you can buy 
units of A and B at this price. The following paragraph describes how the price per unit 
of A and B will be determined.  
 In each period, you are asked to enter the amount of cash you are willing to pay 
to buy good A, and the amount you are willing to pay to buy good B (see the center of 
Screen 1). The sum of these two amounts cannot exceed your current holdings of money 
at the beginning of the period plus the amount you borrow from the bank. The interest 
rate for money borrowed is 5 percent per period. The computer will calculate the sum of 
the amounts offered by all participants for good A. (= SumA). It will also calculate the 
total number of units of A available for sale (nA, which will be 1,000 if we have five 
participants each with ownership claim for 200 units of good A). The computer then 
calculates the price of A, PA = SumA/nA. 
 
If you offered to pay bA to buy good A, you will get bA/PA units of good A. 
 
The same procedure is carried out for good B.    33
 
The number of units of A and B you buy (and consume), will determine the 
amount of points you earn for period t: 
 
Points earnedt = 10 * (bA/PA * bB/PB)
0.5 * beta
t-1 
In this session, beta =1 which means that the last term beta
t-1 is always equal to 1. 
Example: If you buy 100 units of A and 100 units of B in the market you earn  
10 * (100 * 100)
0.5 = 1,000 points.  
 
Your money at the end of a period (=starting money for the next period) will be : 
                                                                   your money at the start of the period  
                                                                                plus the amount you borrow 
   plus money from the sale of your initial entitlement to proceeds from A or B 
                                                          minus the amount you pay to buy A and B 
                                                                                  minus interest on your loan 
                                                            minus repayment of the money borrowed   34
Earnings for the 
current period 
Information on bids 
and transactions in 
good A 
Information on bids 





so far. This 
number/1000 will be 
the US-$ you get 
If you end a period with negative money holdings, you have to take a loan of at 
least this amount to proceed (roll the loan over). Your final money holdings will be 
relevant to your score only after the close of the last period. If you have any money left 
over it is worthless to you. If your money is not enough to pay back any loan then your 
remaining debt will be divided by 4 and this number will be subtracted from your total 
points earned.  Screen 2 shows an example of calculations for Period 2. There are 10 
participants in the market, and half of them have 200 units of A, the other half 200 units 






















The earnings of each period (shown in the last column in the lower part of Screen 2) will 
be added up at the end of run. At the end they will be converted into real Dollars at the 
rate of 400 points = 1 US-$ and this amount will be paid out to you.   35
How to calculate the points you earn: 
 
The points earned are calculated are calculates with the following formula: 
 
Points earned = 10 * (bA/PA * bB/PB)
0.5 
 
To give you an understanding for the formula the following Table might be useful. It 
shows the resulting points from different combinations of goods A and B. It is obvious, 
that more goods mean more points, however, to get more goods you usually have to pay 
more, thereby reducing your money balance, which will limit your ability to buy in later 
periods. 
 
  Units of good B you buy and consume 
  0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200  225  250
0  0  0  0000000  0  0
25  0 250 354 433 500 559 612 661 707 750 791
50  0 354 500 612 707 791 866 935 1000  1061  1118
75  0 433 612 750 866 968 1061 1146 1225  1299  1369
100  0 500 707 866 1000 1118 1225 1323 1414  1500  1581
125  0 559 791 968 1118 1250 1369 1479 1581  1677  1768
150  0 612 866 1061 1225 1369 1500 1620 1732  1837  1936
175  0 661 935 1146 1323 1479 1620 1750 1871  1984  2092
200  0 707  1000 1225 1414 1581 1732 1871 2000  2121  2236








250  0 791  1118 1369 1581 1768 1936 2092 2236  2372  2500
 
Examples:  
1)  If you buy 50 units of good A and 75 units of good B and both prices are 20, then 
your points from consuming the goods are 612. Your net change in money is 200 
(A or B) * 20 = 4,000 minus 50 * 20 minus 75 * 20 = 1,500, so you have 1,500 
more to spend or save in the next period. 
2)  If you buy 150 units of good A and 125 units of good B and both prices are 20, 
then your points from consuming the goods are 1,369. Your net cash balance is 
200 (A or B) * 20 = 4,000 minus 150 * 20 minus 125 * 20 = -1,500, so you have 
1,500 less to spend or save in the next period. 
 